In an era of closer worldwide economic integration, the role that environmental regulations play in shaping a country's comparative advantage is greater than ever. This has lead to fears that 'dirty' firms will relocate from developed to developing countries where environmental regulations may be less stringent -the so called pollution haven hypothesis. To date however there is little support for the existence of pollution havens despite anecdotal evidence and the theoretical predictions. In this paper we employ a unique industry level data set for Japan and examine whether Japanese industries have relocated production to their ASEAN neighbours in response to the relative stringency of Japanese environmental regulations. Not only do we find no evidence for pollution haven consistent behaviour but also some indication that the complex relationship between the characteristics of Japanese dirty industries and environmental regulations may actually have reduced Japanese outward FDI to the 
Introduction
As barriers to international trade continue to fall, environmental regulations are becoming an important influence on a country's comparative advantage. If international competitiveness is influenced by differences in environmental regulations then the relocation of firms or adverse changes to a country's bilateral trade flows may result in protectionist arguments for a reduction in regulations. Some economists believe that governments will therefore attempt to attract FDI by competitively undercutting each other's environmental regulations (race to the bottom). Such fears pervade the thinking of developed country governments. For the US with Mexico, the European Union (EU) with Eastern Europe and Japan with its less developed ASEAN neighbours, fears exist that pollution intensive multinational corporations (MNCs) will relocate from the developed country to so called pollution havens where environmental regulations are less severe. In this paper we investigate the relationship between outbound Japanese FDI and the relative stringency of environmental regulations between Japan and three near neighbours. Although empirical studies on the determinants of Japanese FDI are extensive (see e.g. Fukao, 1996;  Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 1993; 1994) there is little research into the relationship between FDI and environmental regulations for Japan. The one exception we are aware of is Friedman et al. (1992) in a study of Japanese manufacturing outbound FDI to the US where they demonstrated that firms tended to choose to locate in states with relatively lax environmental regulations. We however are interested in 2 Japan now invests approximately 10% of its outbound FDI into ASEAN and Asia's newly industrialized economies. A recent Asian Times article (August 2 nd 2005) notes "Individual firms such as Denso, Mazda and Mitsubishi are sending billions of dollars into countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines to produce finished goods and components for domestic, as well as external, consumption". A recent white paper also encourages Japanese firms to consider basing more production in these countries (METI 2005). outbound FDI to less developed countries where there are likely to be significant differences in environmental regulations.
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In the existing literature, early support for the PHH was found by Lucas et al. (1992) and Birdsall and Wheeler (1992) who claimed that the growth in pollution intensity in developing countries was highest in periods when OECD environmental regulations were strengthened and by Mani and Wheeler (1998) who found a temporary pollution haven effect in an examination of import-export ratios for dirty industries. More recent work by Fontagne et al. (2001) and Keller and Levinson (2002) that control for endogeneity between trade and regulations also finds support for the PHH. In contrast, earlier papers by Tobey (1990) , Jaffe et al. (1995) , Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) , and Janicke et al. (1997) found no evidence that the stringency of a country's environmental regulations is a determinant of its dirty product net exports or has a significant effect on the industrial competitiveness of developed countries.
Considering more closely the evidence from the existing research on the relationship between FDI and the environment, the results are also mixed and generally find no concrete link between industry abatement costs and developed country outbound FDI flows. For example, Dean (1992) , Wheeler and Moody (1992) , Zarsky (1999) Fabry and 3 A large literature has developed that examines different aspects of FDI such as: the structural determinants of FDI flows for developing countries (see e.g. Froot 1993 , De Mello 1997 , Noorbakhsh et al. 2001 ; the relationship between FDI and productivity spillovers (see e.g., Aitken et al. 1996 , Aitken and Harrison 1999 and Görg and Strobl 2001 ; and new global determinants of FDI such as information technology, the global shift to services and the third wave of democratisation (see e.g. and Addison and Heshmati 2004) . Zenghi (2000) , Eskeland and Harrison (2003) and Dean et al. (2005) find no evidence that firms move to regions with relatively lax environmental standards. The latter paper examines FDI into China and finds that regulations affect location choice by origin with dirty investment from Hong Kong Macao, and Taiwan being attracted to low regulation provinces but investment from the OECD (whether clean or dirty) being attracted to high regulation regions. In contrast Rowland and Feiock (1991) , List and Co (2000) and Cole and Elliott (2005) do find some evidence that regulations did have a significant impact on FDI patterns with the latter examining US outbound FDI to Brazil and Mexico, previously identified as two of the most likely pollution havens for the US in terms of capital intensity and regulation differences. Interestingly work by McConnell and Schwab (1990) and Smarzynska Javorcik and Wei (2004) found that firms moved to regions with stricter environmental regulations -the opposite result to the predictions of the PHH.
Recent evidence for US inward FDI has however had more success in finding a pollution haven effect (see e.g. List et al. 2001 , Keller and Levinson 2002 and Fredriksson et al. 2003 ).
The mixed support for the pollution haven hypothesis in part motivated our choice of partner country. By choosing Indonesia and the Philippines we hoped to select those countries that were the most likely candidates to be pollution havens. In both of these countries environmental regulations are likely to be not only weak but also not enforced.
For this reason we did not include Singapore although we did include the more developed Malaysia to see if there is any discernible difference in the results. 5 It has recently been suggested that, like trade flows, foreign investment flows are at least partially driven by factor endowments, particularly those that flow from North to South (see e.g. Caves 1982 , Helpman 1984 , Markusen 1984 . If so, then we may expect a capital-intensive firm to invest in a capital abundant country, whilst a labour-intensive firm would prefer a labour-intensive country. However, capital-intensive sectors are also typically pollution intensive, yet capital abundant countries are typically those with some of the highest environmental regulations. Thus, this 'capital-labour hypothesis' (KLH) appears to generate forces that oppose the PHH. The KLH implies that the capital abundant North will specialize in capital (and pollution) intensive production, whilst the labour abundant South will do the opposite. In contrast, the PHH implies that the low regulation South will specialize in pollution (and capital) intensive production whilst the North does the opposite. The opposing forces of the PHH and KLH may therefore explain why the empirical literature that tests the PHH finds at best mixed results. For further discussion see Antweiler et al. (2001) and Cole and Elliott (2003) .
Additional explanations for the lack of pollution haven evidence include; (i) the belief that pollution will reduce the productivity of the hosts labour force, thus raising labour costs; (ii) the lack of environmental regulations may be a reflection of the poor quality of the existing government's ability to manage the economy; (iii) the level of sunk costs in terms of clean technology development already committed to the home market; (v) the endogeneity of environmental regulations which means that cross sectional analyses cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity among countries or regions (vi) countries with weak regulations will typically have weaker legal systems and lack well defined business rights and responsibilities whereas a developed country investor is likely to prefer a country with clear regulations, thereby avoiding the arbitrary enforcement and deal making inherent in a country with a weak legal system; (vii) a Porter-hypothesis type effect whereby higher regulations at home encourage the introduction of cleaner technologies that also improve efficiency (via reduced marginal costs) and productivity. Similarly, if a firm has to then pay lower total regulation costs it may free up funds for additional FDI. In the context of North-South FDI flows, Smarzynska and Wei (2001) also suggest a number of additional reasons for the lack of PHH evidence including the use of country or industry-level data (masking pollution haven effects at the firm level) and the accuracy of the measurement of the pollution intensity of multinational firms.
Taking into account the factors outlined above, the contribution of this paper is as follows:
first, we construct a unique industry level data set for Japan that attempts to measure environmental abatement costs for the first time in a country other than the US; second, we employ this data to investigate whether any pollution haven consistent evidence exists for Japan and three countries in South-East Asia that were likely to act as the hosts for outward FDI flows in industries that produce dirty goods during the period considered.
This remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the previous theoretical literature on FDI flows and the environment. Section 3 then examines the linkages between capital, pollution intensity and environmental regulations, whilst Section 4 provides the econometric analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Considerations
In this section we provide a brief theoretical overview. Given the mixed empirical evidence it is useful to discuss the mechanisms by which the effect of environmental regulations on FDI maybe ambiguous and hence why pollution haven consistent behaviour has been difficult to come by. We begin with the reasonable assumption that profit-maximizing firms will take all costs into account when choosing where to locate.
As environmental regulations increase, the impact that regulations have on a firms cost base will also increase with the possibility that a firm may begin to consider its location decision more carefully in light of a rise in marginal costs. However, it is also likely that regions with strict environmental regulations will have a higher environmental quality and hence a better quality of life and health for managers and employees and a lower risk of being obliged to clean up previous environmental contamination events. Regulations may, therefore, be an incentive for dirty industries to locate to regions with relatively strict environmental regulations (Adam, 1997; OECD, 1997) .
In the recent FDI literature attempts have been made to provide models that contain elements of industrial organization; the theory of multinationals; and location theory. 6 The standard approach to FDI inflows to developing countries is based on endogenous growth theory where FDI increases capital stock and technological know how which in turn raises income and labour productivity in the host country which eventually results in higher GDP and tax revenues. The externality, usually modelled via an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function and then taking lags and time derivatives to derive a standard growth accounting equation, can also be negative if there are substantial remittances of profits and dividends or the multinational has obtained significant tax or other concessions from the host government that crowds out domestic investment.
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In this paper however, we are concerned with the effect of sectoral differences in environmental regulations and capital intensities between a developed and developing country.
Although there are a limited number of theoretical studies that directly examine the effect of environmental regulations and capital intensity on outbound FDI, useful insights can be gleaned by examining the framework proposed by Eskeland and Harrison (2003) who present a simple model to demonstrate that the effect of an increase in environmental regulations at home can have an ambiguous effect on outward FDI.
The ambiguity arises from the complementarity's or otherwise between capital and pollution abatement where, depending on these complementarities, environmental regulations could lead to an increase or decrease in investment by profit maximising firms in both the host (developing) and donor (developed) countries.
The pollution haven argument is that as abatement costs increase, it is more attractive for a firm to relocate production to an alternative locality. If, however, pollution intensive firms are the most capital intensive, the effect of increased regulations may be ambiguous. For example, if abatement costs fall with the scale of output such that an increase in environmental regulations results in an increase in local production that will lower marginal abatement costs.
Assume the market for a homogeneous product in a given sector is served by two sets of firms, those of the home country (H) and those in the foreign country (F). Let the profits function for a firm located in H be:
where p is the price of output, x H is firm sales, c H are the firms operating costs (short run marginal costs), k H is the firms capital stock, r is the cost of capital and a H are the abatement costs.
If c H is continuous, twice differentiable and convex this will also be the case for ̟ H . Assuming that short run marginal costs are positive, our hypothesis stems from the assumption that capital reduces operating costs while abatement costs increase operating costs. If we take the profit maximizing first order conditions with respect to capital and output and differentiate these with respect to environmental regulations we can solve for the effect on investment and output decisions. Given that a H is a government controlled parameter the effect is to increase total-operating costs upwards (which shifts up average costs).
Assume that capital can adjust in the intermediate run (and assume a no zero profit condition).
To obtain the pollution haven result, it is sufficient (but not necessary) to assume that the output price does not change, that abatement costs increase marginal costs and importantly that capital and abatement are unrelated. For example, if capital reduces marginal costs (due to the introduction of capital intensive technologies being cleaner) then abatement and capital expenditures would be endogenous. The actual relationship between capital and abatement costs is ambiguous if capital investment lowers abatement costs and marginal operating costs.
For example, certain costly and cleaner capital investments may only be economically viable if the abatement costs are above a certain percentage of total costs and lower marginal costs.
The parameters of the model determine whether; (i) a firm stays at home, keeps the old technology and pays the abatements costs; (ii) moves location and keeps the old technology and pays lower abatement costs (and shuts the existing plant) or; (iii) remains at home and invests in cleaner technology and pays lower abatement costs.
A further explanation of why a firm may have a preference to invest at home is that the relative capital intensity of dirty industries makes them ill-suited for relocation from developed to developing countries since the scarcity (and hence cost) of physical capital in developing countries relative to the cost of capital at home may outweigh any benefit from lower environmental regulations.
In this paper we therefore investigate the relationship between a sector's outbound FDI and pollution abatement costs. We also control for a number of other relevant variables such as capital-labour ratios, market size, wage differentials, home and host country industry growth rates, exchange rates and host country infrastructure that are common to many empirical FDI 
Methodology and Data Considerations
In this paper we examine Japanese FDI to Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines between 1986 and 1998 and ask whether the costs of environmental regulations in Japan are a determinant of Japan's outward FDI to these countries. Our analysis covers ten different manufacturing industries: textiles and clothes; wood and wood products; pulp, paper and paper products; printing; chemicals and chemical products, refined petroleum products, non-metallic mineral products; iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, fabricated metal products; machinery and equipment and precision machinery; electrical machinery; motor vehicles and ship building; and other manufacturing industry. In a sensitivity analysis these ten industries are also divided into "dirty" and "non-dirty" industries with those industries in bold being classified as dirty. Since the number of the firm surveyed are different for each year, we divide investment cost for pollution abatement for each industry by the number of firms used in the survey for each industry. We further divide this by the firms' sales revenue since large firm have a tendency to conduct larger pollution abatement investment.
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To test for the determinants of Japanese FDI to three South East Asian countries we employ the following two general specifications adopted for sector i and year t. The dependent variable (FDI) is Japanese outward FDI flow at the industry level divide by industrial sales. The independent variables include the following: pollution abatement capital expenditure cost (PACE) for industry i, measured as pollution abatement expenditure cost per firm divided by industrial sales; capital-labour ratio of each industry in the home country (KLratio) to measure the relative capital intensity of the industry; growth of each industry in the home country between year t and year t-1 (IndGrowth) under the premise that expanding industries are more likely to invest abroad; scale of each industry in the host country (Scale), which is the output for each industry in Malaysia, Indonesia or the Philippines under the assumption that Japanese FDI will be attracted to countries with a large domestic market; industrial growth of host countries between year t and year t-1 (HostIndGrowth); the wage differential between Japan and each host country (WAGEdiff) under the assumption that large factor price differentials should increase FDI; the exchange rate between yen and dollar (Exch) under the assumption that FDI will increase as the Yen appreciates; a host country infrastructure variable (Infra), defined by the number of telephone mainlines per one thousand people; year dummies (Year); and industry dummies (Industry). These variables are included to cover both 'push' factors (home country's factors) and 'pull' factors (host country's factors).
See Table 1 of the appendix for detailed definitions and sources while Tables 2 and 3 of the appendix provide summary statistics and a correlation matrix.
Our prior expectations are that the estimated coefficients for IndGrowth, Scale, HostIndGrowth, Infra and WAGEdiff will be positive while the coefficient on KLratio and Exch will be negative.
Our prediction for PACE is ambiguous. All regressions are estimated using Generalised Least Squares (GLS) using fixed effects estimators. Random effects results are available from the authors upon request.
Results

Table 1 reports the results for equations (2) and (3).
[ Table 1 about here] Table 1 provides the determinants of Japanese FDI to Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. For each individual country and our pooled sample we report two sets of results.
The first column of each country includes our standard industry level variables but also the country specific variables (Infra and Exch) which means that year dummies cannot be included (equation 2). The second column includes year dummies but drops the country specific variables (equation 3).
For our pooled sample, that considers all three countries together (regressions 7 and 8), our results seem to suggest that environmental regulations do not have a significant impact on the decision of Japanese firms to invest abroad in the sense that regulations do not seem to be a significant push factor for Japanese firms. However, when we look at each country separately while we find positive but insignificant coefficients for Malaysia and Indonesia we find a negative and significant coefficient for the Philippines. This negative and significant coefficient deserves further attention as it would appear to suggest that high environmental regulations in Japan discourages firms from relocating or investing in the Philippines. This result is opposite to the predictions of the PHH.
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Turning to the coefficients on our other independent variables we observe, for the pooled sample, that the capital-labour ratio (KLratio) has a positive coefficient so that the more capital intensive an industry, ceteris paribus, the more likely it is to undertake outward FDI -a result that is contrary to the predictions of the KLH although it appears to be driven by a strong positive coefficient for Malaysia (the most capital intensive of our three countries). The industry growth rate (IndGrowth) generally has the expected positive and significant coefficient meaning that firms from a growing industry are more likely to undertake outbound FDI.
Likewise, for the pooled sample, the size of the host countries industry (capturing market size) (Scale), host industry growth (HostIndGrowth) and host infrastructure (Infra) have the expected positive and significant coefficients although these are not always consistent across countries.
Wage difference (WAGEdiff) appears to be positive and significant for Malaysia suggesting that lower industry wages is a pull factor for Japanese FDI. All other variables appear to be 10 One weakness with our analysis is that due to data limitations we are unable to measure industry level regulations for our three host countries. It is therefore not possible to know whether the gap between Japanese and host country regulations increased or decreased during our time period although we can safely assume that Japanese regulations are considerably more stringent and more readily enforced so we suspect that the gap will have, if anything, increased. significant in at least one of our specifications and it is reassuring that the signs are generally consistent and never exhibit contrasting signs and significance. Finally, the exchange rate (Exch) has the predicted negative coefficients although the latter seems to be driven by the strong negative coefficient for the Philippines.
Sensitivity Analysis
Our primary concern is that Table 1 ignores possible endogeneity concerns between FDI and environmental regulations. Our measure of pollution abatement costs, PACE, suffers from two potential weaknesses. Firstly, since Japanese polluters may respond to more stringent regulations by investing in green technologies, pollution abatement expenditure costs may not capture all such expenditures and hence may underestimate true regulation costs for some industries. Secondly, faced with the rapid migration of firms within certain industries, the Japanese government may respond by reducing regulation costs within those industries. This would suggest that PACE could be endogenous with regard to FDI.
In order to address both of these issues we lag PACE by one year. Similar arguments can also be made for the relationship between a host country's industry size and growth. Therefore, in Table 2 we lag PACE, HostIndGrowth and Scale by one year. The results using lagged PACE stem from a fixed effects specification. A Hausman (FE v. RE) test indicates that for the majority of our estimations the effects α i and δ t are correlated with the independent variables and therefore the random effects model cannot be estimated consistently.
11
[ Table 2 about here]
If we first examine the pooled sample results we see that the sign and significance of all our variables are generally of the same sign and significance. The only difference worthy of further comment is the negative and significant coefficient on PACE for Malaysia (regression 10). This supports the consistently negative coefficient on PACE for the Philippines (regression 13). In sum, the results in Table 2 appear to fully support those reported in Table   1 , suggesting that endogeneity and/or measurement error are not unduly influencing our results and more importantly our PACE coefficients.
For a further sensitivity check we took the analysis one step further and instead of splitting our sample by country we split our industry sample into dirty and clean industries. This would allow us to observe whether the generally insignificant coefficient on PACE was robust to our choice of industry. One might expect for example, that any increase in environmental regulations would be likely to impact on those industries that are already large polluters and should have little impact on the location decision of relatively clean industries where the increase in regulations would be less likely to impact significantly on its cost base.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 therefore presents the results for dirty and clean industries separately with the first four columns presenting the results for the standard regression (similar to Table 1 ) and the final four columns attempting to control for endogeneity issues by lagging PACE, HostIndGrowth and Scale. The results are broadly similar to Tables 1 and 2 although even when we consider only dirty industries there is still no significant positive effect of environmental regulations on Japanese outbound FDI. Interestingly, the capital-labour ratio is positve and significant for clean industries but insignificant for dirty industries. This suggests that while the high physical capital intensity of dirty industries is a significant obstacle for a company to overcome before it will consider relocating abroad it is less so for clean industries. This might suggest that the earlier positive coefficient on KLratio for Malaysia (and hence the pooled sample) was driven by Japanese FDI in a relatively clean sector. 12 We also considered whether FDI should be modelled as a dynamic process and investigate the role played by a lagged dependent variable. The inclusion of a one-period lagged dependent variable in equation (2) does little to change the sign and significance of the other variables and is statistically insignificant. The results were again broadly similar with the only significant coefficient on PACE being negative and significant for the Philippines.
Summary and Conclusions
Results are available upon request.
A number of reasons have been offered to explain why, despite the predictions of many theoretical studies, little or no empirical evidence of pollution havens has been found. The aim of this paper has therefore been to see whether any such evidence is evident from an analysis of another developed country using the only other time series of pollution abatement costs that we are aware of that covers a similar period to that of the US.
We examined that impact of environmental regulations on Japanese outward FDI to three South East Asian countries between 1986 and 1998. If comparative advantage is determined by both differences in factor endowments and environmental regulations, then pollution intensive FDI will be drawn to countries with a high level of capital endowment relative to the stringency of their environmental regulations. Following this line of reasoning, countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia provide a good test of the theoretical predictions of the PHH and KLH. Section 3 therefore examined the determinants of Japanese multi-sector FDI to these three countries and found the capital-labour ratio of a sector to be a positive determinant of FDI. We also found the level of pollution abatement costs in a Japanese industry to be a generally statistically insignificant determinant of that industry's FDI providing evidence of an effect counter to the predictions of the pollution haven hypothesis.
However, for two countries, the Philippines and less so for Malaysia, it appears that regulations in Japan acted as a deterrent to Japanese firms to invest abroad. This seemingly perverse result not only shows that there is no pollution haven effect but that stringent domestic regulations may actually reduce or at least slow down dirty FDI in dirty goods from developed to developing countries. Our results complement the recent work by Dean et al. (2005) in China where FDI from OECD countries was attracted to high regulation regions.
Our conclusion supports those of other studies that have found evidence for pollution havens difficult to come by. Theoretical models that have predicted the widespread formation of pollution havens are typically set in worlds in which comparative advantage is determined purely by differences in the stringency of environmental regulations. In reality, those countries with lax environmental standards typically do not have the level of accumulated capital that is necessary to attract capital (pollution) intensive investment. Moreover, the impact of increased regulation may be to induce the local industry to invest in cleaner technology at home and thus lowering marginal production costs and making the domestic production of dirty goods more attractive. 
